AN0266: Analytic 0266
Use of native tools or scripting (e.g., `usermod`, `passwd`, `groupmod`) to escalate permissions or persist access on existing users, correlated with login or process events.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
This analytic matters because changes to existing Linux user accounts can turn a normal account into a privileged or persistent access path. For leaders, the key issue is not the specific command names alone, but whether the organization can prove it sees and reviews account-modification activity alongside logins and process execution when investigating suspicious Linux access.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as an identity and Linux operational resilience control validation. Executives should ask whether privileged account changes on Linux systems are logged, retained, reviewed, and correlated with user login and process activity. This supports incident response decisions, compliance evidence around account administration, and assurance that persistence or privilege changes on existing users would not be missed due to logging gaps.
Technical view
For SOC, detection engineering, and IR teams, validate visibility for Linux use of native account-management tools or scripting, including examples named by ATT&CK such as usermod, passwd, and groupmod. The supplied ATT&CK object specifies correlation with login or process events, so the analytic should not rely only on command matching; it should connect account-change activity to who logged in, what process executed, and when. Tactics and a formal detection specification are not provided, so local tuning and environment baselining are required.
Likely telemetry
- Linux process execution telemetry showing command name, command line where available, parent process, user, timestamp, and host
- Linux authentication and login records showing successful logins, session starts, source context where available, user, timestamp, and host
- Linux account and group change evidence, such as records indicating password, user, or group modification activity
- Administrative activity logs or audit records that can distinguish expected account maintenance from unusual changes
Detection direction
- Confirm that Linux process and login telemetry are collected from relevant systems and can be correlated by host, user, and time.
- Tune for native account-management activity involving existing users, especially when it occurs near interactive logins or unusual process activity.
- Account for legitimate administration, automation, and maintenance windows to reduce false positives without suppressing high-risk privileged account changes.
- Look for blind spots where command-line logging, authentication logs, or account-change auditing are absent, incomplete, or not centrally retained.
- Because ATT&CK provides no official detection logic for this analytic, treat any rule as a locally validated hypothesis rather than guaranteed coverage.
Mitigation priorities
- Establish least-privilege administration and limit who can modify Linux users, passwords, and groups.
- Require accountable administrative workflows for user and group changes so expected activity can be distinguished from suspicious changes.
- Ensure Linux authentication, process, and account-change logs are enabled, centrally collected, and retained for incident response and audit needs.
- Periodically review privileged group membership and account-change history for unauthorized or unexplained modifications.
- Test incident response playbooks for suspected Linux account escalation or persistence using available telemetry rather than assuming the necessary evidence exists.
Analyst notes and limits
This object is a detection analytic, not a full ATT&CK technique entry. It is limited to Linux and describes use of native tools or scripting to escalate permissions or persist access on existing users, correlated with login or process events. No relationship context, tactic mapping, aliases, or official detection logic were supplied.
Assessment is constrained to the supplied ATT&CK fields and external reference. The object does not specify concrete detection logic, severity, data components, related techniques, threat groups, campaigns, or evidence of active exploitation. Local system configuration, logging depth, retention, and administrative practices are required to determine real coverage.
Analytic 0266
Use of native tools or scripting (e.g., `usermod`, `passwd`, `groupmod`) to escalate permissions or persist access on existing users, correlated with login or process events.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 5dc8cc36d88b… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack AN0266Open source URL
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