AN0252: Analytic 0252
Installation of configuration profiles or plist entries associated with malicious or unauthorized browser extensions
Analyst context for executives and security teams
AN0252 focuses on macOS evidence of configuration profiles or plist entries tied to malicious or unauthorized browser extensions. For leaders, the practical issue is governance and persistence: browser extensions can affect user data access and browsing activity, while macOS profiles and preference files may show whether extensions were intentionally managed or introduced outside approved controls.
Executive priority
Treat this as a control-validation item for endpoint governance and audit readiness on macOS fleets. Security leaders should ask whether the organization can distinguish approved browser-extension management from unauthorized profile or plist changes, and whether SOC and IT teams have evidence to support incident decisions when suspicious extensions are found.
Technical view
SOC, detection engineering, and IR teams should validate visibility into macOS configuration profiles and plist modifications associated with browser extension installation or management. Because the official ATT&CK object provides no detection logic or relationship context, teams should build local criteria around approved extension inventories, authorized management profiles, expected plist locations, and change timing. The key defensive question is whether profile/plist changes can be tied to a legitimate management action, user action, or suspicious/unauthorized extension activity.
Likely telemetry
- macOS configuration profile inventory and installation/change records
- macOS plist file creation and modification events relevant to browser extension configuration
- Endpoint management or MDM records showing authorized profiles and policy pushes
- Browser extension inventory from managed macOS endpoints where available
- Endpoint file integrity or EDR telemetry for profile/plist changes
Detection direction
- Baseline approved browser extensions and managed configuration profiles for macOS systems before alerting on deviations.
- Correlate profile or plist changes with MDM/IT change records to reduce false positives from legitimate administration.
- Prioritize investigation when new or modified profiles/plists reference extensions not present in approved inventories.
- Validate whether telemetry captures both centrally managed profile installation and local plist changes; either gap can create a blind spot.
- Because ATT&CK provides no official detection expression for AN0252, detection logic should be tested against local macOS builds, browser mix, and management tooling.
Mitigation priorities
- Maintain an approved browser-extension policy and inventory for macOS endpoints.
- Use centralized endpoint or device management to enforce authorized browser and extension configuration where applicable.
- Restrict or review unauthorized configuration profile installation paths and administrative rights that allow persistent configuration changes.
- Retain profile, plist, and endpoint management logs long enough to support incident response and compliance evidence.
- Periodically audit macOS endpoints for unmanaged profiles or browser-extension configuration drift.
Analyst notes and limits
This take is based only on the supplied ATT&CK analytic fields. The object identifies a macOS detection analytic for installation of configuration profiles or plist entries associated with malicious or unauthorized browser extensions, but it does not provide tactics, detection logic, aliases, labels, or relationship context.
No official detection content or related ATT&CK objects were supplied. Local browser types, MDM design, endpoint logging, approved extension lists, and macOS configuration paths must be validated before operationalizing this analytic.
Analytic 0252
Installation of configuration profiles or plist entries associated with malicious or unauthorized browser extensions
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | c41098247dea… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
mitre-attack AN0252Open source URL
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