AN0250: Analytic 0250
Behavioral chain involving suspicious use of GetProcAddress and LoadLibrary following memory allocation and manual mapping, often paired with low entropy strings, abnormal API use without static import tables, or delayed module load behaviors.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
This analytic matters because it points to a Windows behavior pattern commonly associated with code being loaded or resolved at runtime rather than through normal static imports. For leaders, the practical issue is not the API names alone, but whether the SOC can see suspicious memory allocation, manual mapping indicators, and delayed module loading well enough to distinguish legitimate software behavior from activity that may bypass simple file- or import-based controls.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as a detection-engineering and incident-readiness validation item for Windows environments. It helps answer whether current endpoint telemetry and SOC workflows can investigate runtime loading behavior that may not be obvious from static file analysis. Because ATT&CK provides no tactic, relationship context, or official detection logic for this analytic, it should be treated as a coverage-validation opportunity rather than a standalone risk conclusion.
Technical view
For SOC and detection teams, validate whether Windows endpoint telemetry can correlate memory allocation or manual mapping indicators with subsequent suspicious GetProcAddress and LoadLibrary usage. Also assess supporting signals named in the object: low-entropy strings, abnormal API use without static import tables, and delayed module load behaviors. Detection should focus on behavioral chains and context, not simple API-name matching, because legitimate Windows applications and security tools may use these APIs.
Likely telemetry
- Windows endpoint detection and response telemetry
- Process behavior events involving memory allocation
- Module load events, including delayed or unusual module loading
- API call telemetry where available for GetProcAddress and LoadLibrary patterns
- File or binary analysis metadata showing absent or unusual static import tables
Detection direction
- Validate that telemetry can connect memory allocation or manual mapping-like behavior to later runtime API resolution or library loading in the same process context.
- Tune detections around behavioral sequences rather than isolated GetProcAddress or LoadLibrary calls to reduce false positives from legitimate software.
- Review whether the environment collects enough module-load, process, and binary metadata to evaluate delayed module loading and abnormal import behavior.
- Because no official detection text or relationship context is supplied, require local baselining and analyst review before treating matches as high-confidence malicious activity.
Mitigation priorities
- Ensure Windows endpoint visibility covers process behavior, module loading, and relevant memory activity needed for investigation.
- Use application control, software inventory, and change-management baselines to help distinguish expected runtime loading behavior from unusual activity.
- Document investigation procedures for suspicious runtime loading chains so incident responders can quickly collect process, module, and binary context.
- Use findings from detection validation to inform control prioritization, audit evidence, and SOC tuning rather than assuming this analytic alone proves compromise.
Analyst notes and limits
This ATT&CK object is a detection analytic for Windows describing a suspicious behavioral chain involving GetProcAddress and LoadLibrary after memory allocation and manual mapping, with possible supporting indicators such as low-entropy strings, abnormal API use without static import tables, or delayed module loads. No tactics, official detection logic, aliases, labels, or relationships were supplied, so interpretation should remain focused on defensive validation.
The supplied ATT&CK fields do not provide active exploitation evidence, attribution, procedures, tactics, mitigations, or a concrete detection query. Local telemetry quality, software baselines, and analyst review are required to determine whether this behavior is suspicious in a specific environment.
Analytic 0250
Behavioral chain involving suspicious use of GetProcAddress and LoadLibrary following memory allocation and manual mapping, often paired with low entropy strings, abnormal API use without static import tables, or delayed module load behaviors.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | a768dd5ec7ad… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack AN0250Open source URL
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