AN0210: Analytic 0210
Detects embedded or emulated VBScript/VBA execution via Wine-based apps, Office for Mac abusing cross-platform .NET features, or macros dropped and invoked via AppleScript or third-party automation tools.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
This analytic matters because it focuses on Windows-style scripting behavior appearing on macOS: embedded or emulated VBScript/VBA through Wine-based apps, Office for Mac cross-platform .NET features, or macros launched through AppleScript or third-party automation. For leaders, the practical issue is not just “macro detection,” but whether macOS endpoints are monitored well enough to catch automation paths that may sit outside traditional Windows-centric controls.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as a macOS endpoint and productivity-suite monitoring gap check. Security leaders should ask whether macro, AppleScript, Office for Mac, Wine-based application, and third-party automation activity are visible in SOC telemetry and incident response playbooks. This is relevant to business continuity and compliance evidence because unmanaged scripting and automation can undermine endpoint control assumptions, especially in mixed Windows/macOS environments.
Technical view
For SOC, detection engineering, and IR teams, validate coverage for macOS processes and automation chains involving Office for Mac, Wine-based applications, AppleScript execution, third-party automation tools, and unusual invocation of VBScript/VBA-like content. Because no official detection logic or ATT&CK tactics are supplied, teams should treat AN0210 as a behavior-focused detection requirement rather than a ready-to-deploy rule. Build local baselines for legitimate Office automation and developer or compatibility tooling before alerting aggressively.
Likely telemetry
- macOS endpoint process creation and parent-child process relationships
- Office for Mac application activity and macro-related events where available
- AppleScript execution evidence, including script interpreter or automation events
- Wine-based application execution and child process activity
- Third-party automation tool execution logs or endpoint telemetry
Detection direction
- Confirm that macOS EDR or endpoint logging captures process lineage for Office, AppleScript, Wine-based applications, and automation tools.
- Tune for unusual combinations, such as Office-related activity invoking automation utilities or compatibility layers in ways not typical for the user or host.
- Baseline legitimate business automation to reduce false positives from approved macros, administrative scripts, accessibility tooling, or developer workflows.
- Correlate script or macro execution with file drops, new automation artifacts, and unexpected child processes rather than relying on a single event.
- Review visibility gaps where Windows-focused macro controls do not extend to Office for Mac or where Wine-based execution is not classified clearly by tooling.
Mitigation priorities
- Inventory macOS systems using Office for Mac, Wine-based applications, and approved automation tools.
- Restrict or govern macro and automation usage according to business need, with documented exceptions.
- Ensure macOS endpoint monitoring is enabled and retained sufficiently for investigation.
- Harden user permissions and application control policies where feasible to limit unauthorized automation or script execution.
- Document detection coverage and response procedures as audit evidence for macOS scripting and productivity-suite abuse scenarios.
Analyst notes and limits
AN0210 is a detection analytic for macOS focused on embedded or emulated VBScript/VBA execution and macro invocation paths involving Wine, Office for Mac, AppleScript, or third-party automation. The value is in validating whether macOS telemetry can expose these cross-platform scripting behaviors, especially in environments whose detection content is primarily Windows-oriented.
The supplied ATT&CK object provides no official detection logic, no tactics, and no relationship context. This take does not infer adversary use, impact, attribution, or guaranteed coverage. Local environment data is required to define normal automation behavior, false-positive thresholds, and deployable detection logic.
Analytic 0210
Detects embedded or emulated VBScript/VBA execution via Wine-based apps, Office for Mac abusing cross-platform .NET features, or macros dropped and invoked via AppleScript or third-party automation tools.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 2bf7a3e866dd… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack AN0210Open source URL
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