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MITRE ATT&CK® Reference

Data Components

Concrete ATT&CK data components linked to detectable techniques.

174 records · validated library

Data Components results

Results are validated against normalized ATT&CK source records when available; sample records are used only in development or empty-data environments.

Data Component Enterprise

DC0075: Instance Enumeration

The process of retrieving or querying a list of virtual machine instances or compute instances within a cloud infrastructure. This activity provides a view of all available or running instances, typically including their associated metadata such as instance ID, name, state, and configuration details. Examples:

- AWS: instance enumeration involves the `DescribeInstances` API call, which retrieves information about running or stopped EC2 instances. - Azure: VM enumeration can be monitored via the `Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/read` operation. - GCP: instance enumeration is logged as an `instance.list` operation within GCP Audit Logs.

*Data Collection Measures:*

- AWS CloudTrail: CloudTrail logs stored in S3 or forwarded to CloudWatch. - Azure Activity Logs: Accessible via Azure Monitor or exported to a storage account. - GCP Audit Logs: Logs Explorer or BigQuery.

Data Component Enterprise

DC0073: Instance Modification

Changes made to a virtual machine (VM) or compute instance, including alterations to its configuration, metadata, attached policies, or operational state. Such modifications can include updating metadata, attaching or detaching resource policies, resizing instances, or modifying network configurations. Examples:

- AWS: instance modifications include API actions like `ModifyInstanceAttribute`, `ModifyInstanceMetadataOptions`, or `RebootInstances`. - Azure: modifications can be tracked through operations like `Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/write`. - GCP: instance modification events include operations like `instances.setMetadata`, `instances.addResourcePolicies`, or `instances.resize`.

*Data Collection Measures:*

- AWS CloudTrail: Log Location: Stored in S3 or forwarded to CloudWatch. - Azure Activity Logs: Log Location: Accessible via Azure Monitor or exported to a storage account. - GCP Audit Logs: Log Location: Logs Explorer or BigQuery.

Data Component Enterprise

DC0080: Instance Start

The initiation or activation of a virtual machine instance within a cloud infrastructure. This action typically involves starting an existing instance that had been stopped or paused, allowing it to resume operation. Examples:

- Google Cloud Platform (GCP): Starting an instance through `instance.start` API activity. - AWS: Logging of `StartInstances` in AWS CloudTrail for EC2 instances. - Azure: `Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/start` entries indicate a VM instance being started.

Data Component Enterprise

DC0089: Instance Stop

The deactivation or shutdown of a virtual machine instance within a cloud infrastructure. This action typically involves stopping a running instance, which halts its operation and releases certain associated resources, such as CPU and memory. Examples:

- Google Cloud Platform (GCP): `instance.stop` events recorded in GCP Audit Logs indicate the deactivation of an instance. - Amazon Web Services (AWS): `StopInstances` actions in AWS CloudTrail indicate EC2 instances being stopped. - Microsoft Azure: `Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/deallocate` or `stop` events in Azure Activity Logs represent a virtual machine being stopped or deallocated.

Data Component Enterprise

DC0031: Kernel Module Load

The process of loading a kernel module into the operating system kernel. Kernel modules are object files that extend the kernel’s functionality, such as adding support for device drivers, new filesystems, or additional system calls. This action can be legitimate (e.g., loading a driver) or malicious (e.g., adding a rootkit).

*Data Collection Measures:*

- Linux: - Auditd: Enable auditing of kernel module loading. Example rule: `-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module,delete_module`. - Syslog: Monitor `/var/log/syslog` or `/var/log/messages` for entries related to kernel module loads. - Systemd Journal: Use `journalctl` to query logs for module loading events: `journalctl -k | grep "Loading kernel module"` - macOS: - Unified Logs: Use the `log` command to query kernel module events: `log show --predicate 'eventMessage contains "kextload"' --info` - Endpoint Security Framework (ESF): Monitor for `ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_KEXTLOAD` (kernel extension loading events). - Kernel-Specific Tools: - Lsmod: Use `lsmod` to list loaded kernel modules in real-time. - Kprobe/eBPF: Use extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) or Kernel Probes (kprobes) to monitor kernel events, including module loading. Example using eBPF tools like BCC: `sudo python /path/to/bcc/tools/kprobe -v do_init_module` - Enable EDR Monitoring: - Configure alerts for: Suspicious kernel module loads from non-standard paths (e.g., /tmp). Unexpected or unsigned kernel modules. - Review detailed telemetry data provided by the EDR for insight into who initiated the module load, the file path, and whether the module was signed.

Data Component Enterprise

DC0067: Logon Session Creation

The successful establishment of a new user session following a successful authentication attempt. This typically signifies that a user has provided valid credentials or authentication tokens, and the system has initiated a session associated with that user account. This data is crucial for tracking authentication events and identifying potential unauthorized access. Examples:

- Windows Systems - Event ID: 4624 - Logon Type: 2 (Interactive) or 10 (Remote Interactive via RDP). - Account Name: JohnDoe - Source Network Address: 192.168.1.100 - Authentication Package: NTLM - Linux Systems - /var/log/utmp or /var/log/wtmp: - Log format: login user [tty] from [source_ip] - User: jane - IP: 10.0.0.5 - Timestamp: 2024-12-28 08:30:00 - macOS Systems - /var/log/asl.log or unified logging framework: - Log: com.apple.securityd: Authentication succeeded for user 'admin' - Cloud Environments - Azure Sign-In Logs: - Activity: Sign-in successful - Client App: Browser - Location: Unknown (Country: X) - Google Workspace - Activity: Login - Event Type: successful_login - Source IP: 203.0.113.55

Data Component ICS

DC0067: Logon Session Creation

The successful establishment of a new user session following a successful authentication attempt. This typically signifies that a user has provided valid credentials or authentication tokens, and the system has initiated a session associated with that user account. This data is crucial for tracking authentication events and identifying potential unauthorized access. Examples:

- Windows Systems - Event ID: 4624 - Logon Type: 2 (Interactive) or 10 (Remote Interactive via RDP). - Account Name: JohnDoe - Source Network Address: 192.168.1.100 - Authentication Package: NTLM - Linux Systems - /var/log/utmp or /var/log/wtmp: - Log format: login user [tty] from [source_ip] - User: jane - IP: 10.0.0.5 - Timestamp: 2024-12-28 08:30:00 - macOS Systems - /var/log/asl.log or unified logging framework: - Log: com.apple.securityd: Authentication succeeded for user 'admin' - Cloud Environments - Azure Sign-In Logs: - Activity: Sign-in successful - Client App: Browser - Location: Unknown (Country: X) - Google Workspace - Activity: Login - Event Type: successful_login - Source IP: 203.0.113.55

Data Component Enterprise

DC0088: Logon Session Metadata

Contextual data about a logon session, such as username, logon type, access tokens (security context, user SIDs, logon identifiers, and logon SID), and any activity associated within it

Data Component ICS

DC0088: Logon Session Metadata

Contextual data about a logon session, such as username, logon type, access tokens (security context, user SIDs, logon identifiers, and logon SID), and any activity associated within it

Data Component Enterprise

DC0011: Malware Content

Code, strings, signatures, and other identifying characteristics of a malicious payload stored within a malware repository. It includes both static (file-based) and dynamic (behavioral or execution-based) components that can be analyzed for threat intelligence, detection, and prevention purposes. Examples:

- Static Analysis: - Executable Code: Analyze binary data to identify unique patterns, obfuscated code, or embedded resources. - Strings Extraction: Use tools like strings or YARA rules to identify hardcoded URLs, IPs, filenames, or suspicious function calls. - Signatures: Extract cryptographic hashes (MD5, SHA256) of files to track known malware variants or detect previously unseen samples. - Dynamic Analysis: - Behavioral Observations: Monitor execution traces to capture API calls, registry modifications, or network traffic patterns indicative of malicious behavior. - Memory Analysis: Examine memory dumps to uncover injected code or runtime-decrypted payloads. - Artifacts: Record file system changes, process creation events, and command-line arguments. - Threat Intelligence Integration: - Campaign Attribution: Associate observed code snippets or signatures with known APT campaigns or ransomware families. - Indicator Sharing: Share identified Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) with threat intelligence platforms (e.g., MISP, OpenCTI). - Examples of Malware Content: - Embedded C2 domains (e.g., malicious-domain.com hardcoded in the payload). - Fileless malware indicators, such as PowerShell scripts invoking Invoke-Mimikatz. - Malware-specific signatures, such as unique PE header values for a particular strain.

*Data Collection Measures:*

- Collection from Public Malware Repositories: - VirusTotal: Obtain samples for static analysis. - Hybrid Analysis: Gather execution data from sandbox analysis. - Any.Run: Access interactive malware execution traces. - MalwareBazaar: Download malware samples for research and signature generation. - Automate data extraction using repository APIs (e.g., VirusTotal API for hash lookups or sample retrieval). - Internal Malware Labs: - Sandbox Environments: Use dynamic malware analysis tools such as Cuckoo Sandbox or Joe Sandbox to execute and monitor malware in a controlled environment. Capture runtime behavior logs, memory dumps, and file system changes. - Reverse Engineering: Disassemble binaries with tools like IDA Pro, Ghidra, or Radare2 to identify malicious functionality and extract code patterns. - EDR/Endpoint Telemetry: - Collect samples of malicious binaries or scripts from infected endpoints using tools like CrowdStrike, Carbon Black, or SentinelOne. - Extract memory-resident payloads from live systems for analysis. - Threat Intelligence Platforms: - Gather contextual metadata for identified malware using tools like OpenCTI, Recorded Future, or ThreatConnect. Participate in intelligence-sharing groups such as ISACs (e.g., FS-ISAC, IT-ISAC). - Custom Data Collection Pipelines: Use open-source tools like malwoverview or Maltrail to automate sample downloads, hash extraction, and IOC generation.

Data Component Enterprise

DC0003: Malware Metadata

Contextual data about a malicious payload, such as compilation times, file hashes, as well as watermarks or other identifiable configuration information

Data Component Enterprise

DC0016: Module Load

When a process or program dynamically attaches a shared library, module, or plugin into its memory space. This action is typically performed to extend the functionality of an application, access shared system resources, or interact with kernel-mode components.

Data Component Mobile

DC0016: Module Load

When a process or program dynamically attaches a shared library, module, or plugin into its memory space. This action is typically performed to extend the functionality of an application, access shared system resources, or interact with kernel-mode components.

Data Component ICS

DC0016: Module Load

When a process or program dynamically attaches a shared library, module, or plugin into its memory space. This action is typically performed to extend the functionality of an application, access shared system resources, or interact with kernel-mode components.

Data Component Enterprise

DC0048: Named Pipe Metadata

Contextual data about a named pipe on a system, including pipe name and creating process (ex: Sysmon EIDs 17-18)

*Data Collection Measures:*

- Windows: - Sysmon Event ID 17: Logs the creation of a named pipe. - Sysmon Event ID 18: Logs connection attempts to a named pipe. - Windows Security Event ID 5145: Logs access attempts to named pipes via SMB shares. - ETW (Event Tracing for Windows): Provides deep telemetry into named pipe interactions. - Linux/macOS: - AuditD (`mkfifo`, `open`, `read`, `write` syscalls): Tracks FIFO (named pipe) creation and usage. - Lsof (`lsof -p ` or `lsof | grep PIPE`): Lists active named pipes and associated processes. - Strace (`strace -e open `): Monitors named pipe interactions. - Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR): - Capture named pipe events as part of process tracking. - Memory Forensics: - Volatility Plugin (`pipescan`): Enumerates named pipes in system memory. - Rekall Framework: Identifies active named pipes and associated processes.

Data Component Mobile

DC0113: Network Communication

Network Communication captures outbound or inbound communication initiated by an application or mobile device, including the domains contacted, protocols used, and session metadata associated with the communication.

Monitoring network communication enables defenders to identify command-and-control traffic, data exfiltration, or suspicious communication patterns originating from mobile applications.

Examples

- Connections to previously unseen domains - Repeated communication with suspicious infrastructure - Communication immediately following application installation

Collection Methods

- Mobile VPN telemetry - Secure web gateway logs - Network detection and response (NDR) - Mobile EDR network monitoring

Data Component Enterprise

DC0082: Network Connection Creation

The initial establishment of a network session, where a system or process initiates a connection to a local or remote endpoint. This typically involves capturing socket information (source/destination IP, ports, protocol) and tracking session metadata. Monitoring these events helps detect lateral movement, exfiltration, and command-and-control (C2) activities.

*Data Collection Measures:*

- Windows: - Event ID 5156 – Filtering Platform Connection - Logs network connections permitted by Windows Filtering Platform (WFP). - Sysmon Event ID 3 – Network Connection Initiated - Captures process, source/destination IP, ports, and parent process. - Linux/macOS: - Netfilter (iptables), nftables logs - Tracks incoming and outgoing network connections. - AuditD (`connect` syscall) - Logs TCP, UDP, and ICMP connections. - Zeek (`conn.log`) - Captures protocol, duration, and bytes transferred. - Cloud & Network Infrastructure: - AWS VPC Flow Logs / Azure NSG Flow Logs - Logs IP traffic at the network level in cloud environments. - Zeek (conn.log) or Suricata (network events) - Captures packet metadata for detection and correlation. - Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR): - Detect anomalous network activity such as new C2 connections or data exfiltration attempts.

Data Component Mobile

DC0082: Network Connection Creation

The initial establishment of a network session, where a system or process initiates a connection to a local or remote endpoint. This typically involves capturing socket information (source/destination IP, ports, protocol) and tracking session metadata. Monitoring these events helps detect lateral movement, exfiltration, and command-and-control (C2) activities.

*Data Collection Measures:*

- Windows: - Event ID 5156 – Filtering Platform Connection - Logs network connections permitted by Windows Filtering Platform (WFP). - Sysmon Event ID 3 – Network Connection Initiated - Captures process, source/destination IP, ports, and parent process. - Linux/macOS: - Netfilter (iptables), nftables logs - Tracks incoming and outgoing network connections. - AuditD (`connect` syscall) - Logs TCP, UDP, and ICMP connections. - Zeek (`conn.log`) - Captures protocol, duration, and bytes transferred. - Cloud & Network Infrastructure: - AWS VPC Flow Logs / Azure NSG Flow Logs - Logs IP traffic at the network level in cloud environments. - Zeek (conn.log) or Suricata (network events) - Captures packet metadata for detection and correlation. - Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR): - Detect anomalous network activity such as new C2 connections or data exfiltration attempts.

Data Component ICS

DC0082: Network Connection Creation

The initial establishment of a network session, where a system or process initiates a connection to a local or remote endpoint. This typically involves capturing socket information (source/destination IP, ports, protocol) and tracking session metadata. Monitoring these events helps detect lateral movement, exfiltration, and command-and-control (C2) activities.

*Data Collection Measures:*

- Windows: - Event ID 5156 – Filtering Platform Connection - Logs network connections permitted by Windows Filtering Platform (WFP). - Sysmon Event ID 3 – Network Connection Initiated - Captures process, source/destination IP, ports, and parent process. - Linux/macOS: - Netfilter (iptables), nftables logs - Tracks incoming and outgoing network connections. - AuditD (`connect` syscall) - Logs TCP, UDP, and ICMP connections. - Zeek (`conn.log`) - Captures protocol, duration, and bytes transferred. - Cloud & Network Infrastructure: - AWS VPC Flow Logs / Azure NSG Flow Logs - Logs IP traffic at the network level in cloud environments. - Zeek (conn.log) or Suricata (network events) - Captures packet metadata for detection and correlation. - Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR): - Detect anomalous network activity such as new C2 connections or data exfiltration attempts.

Data Component Enterprise

DC0085: Network Traffic Content

The full packet capture (PCAP) or session data that logs both protocol headers and payload content. This allows analysts to inspect command and control (C2) traffic, exfiltration, and other suspicious activity within network communications. Unlike metadata-based logs, full content analysis enables deeper protocol inspection, payload decoding, and forensic investigations.

*Data Collection Measures:*

- Network Packet Capture (Full Content Logging) - Wireshark / tcpdump / tshark - Full packet captures (PCAP files) for manual analysis or IDS correlation. `tcpdump -i eth0 -w capture.pcap` - Zeek (formerly Bro) - Extracts protocol headers and payload details into structured logs. `echo "redef Log::default_store = Log::ASCII;" > local.zeek | zeek -Cr capture.pcap local.zeek` - Suricata / Snort (IDS/IPS with PCAP Logging) - Deep packet inspection (DPI) with signature-based and behavioral analysis. `suricata -c /etc/suricata/suricata.yaml -i eth0 -l /var/log/suricata` - Host-Based Collection - Sysmon Event ID 22 – DNS Query Logging, Captures DNS requests made by processes, useful for detecting C2 domains. - Sysmon Event ID 3 – Network Connection Initiated, Logs process-to-network connection relationships. - AuditD (Linux) – syscall=connect, Monitors outbound network requests from processes. `auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S connect -k network_activity` - Cloud & SaaS Traffic Collection - AWS VPC Flow Logs / Azure NSG Flow Logs / Google VPC Flow Logs, Captures metadata about inbound/outbound network traffic. - Cloud IDS (AWS GuardDuty, Azure Sentinel, Google Chronicle), Detects malicious activity in cloud environments by analyzing network traffic patterns.

Data Component Mobile

DC0085: Network Traffic Content

The full packet capture (PCAP) or session data that logs both protocol headers and payload content. This allows analysts to inspect command and control (C2) traffic, exfiltration, and other suspicious activity within network communications. Unlike metadata-based logs, full content analysis enables deeper protocol inspection, payload decoding, and forensic investigations.

*Data Collection Measures:*

- Network Packet Capture (Full Content Logging) - Wireshark / tcpdump / tshark - Full packet captures (PCAP files) for manual analysis or IDS correlation. `tcpdump -i eth0 -w capture.pcap` - Zeek (formerly Bro) - Extracts protocol headers and payload details into structured logs. `echo "redef Log::default_store = Log::ASCII;" > local.zeek | zeek -Cr capture.pcap local.zeek` - Suricata / Snort (IDS/IPS with PCAP Logging) - Deep packet inspection (DPI) with signature-based and behavioral analysis. `suricata -c /etc/suricata/suricata.yaml -i eth0 -l /var/log/suricata` - Host-Based Collection - Sysmon Event ID 22 – DNS Query Logging, Captures DNS requests made by processes, useful for detecting C2 domains. - Sysmon Event ID 3 – Network Connection Initiated, Logs process-to-network connection relationships. - AuditD (Linux) – syscall=connect, Monitors outbound network requests from processes. `auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S connect -k network_activity` - Cloud & SaaS Traffic Collection - AWS VPC Flow Logs / Azure NSG Flow Logs / Google VPC Flow Logs, Captures metadata about inbound/outbound network traffic. - Cloud IDS (AWS GuardDuty, Azure Sentinel, Google Chronicle), Detects malicious activity in cloud environments by analyzing network traffic patterns.

Data Component ICS

DC0085: Network Traffic Content

The full packet capture (PCAP) or session data that logs both protocol headers and payload content. This allows analysts to inspect command and control (C2) traffic, exfiltration, and other suspicious activity within network communications. Unlike metadata-based logs, full content analysis enables deeper protocol inspection, payload decoding, and forensic investigations.

*Data Collection Measures:*

- Network Packet Capture (Full Content Logging) - Wireshark / tcpdump / tshark - Full packet captures (PCAP files) for manual analysis or IDS correlation. `tcpdump -i eth0 -w capture.pcap` - Zeek (formerly Bro) - Extracts protocol headers and payload details into structured logs. `echo "redef Log::default_store = Log::ASCII;" > local.zeek | zeek -Cr capture.pcap local.zeek` - Suricata / Snort (IDS/IPS with PCAP Logging) - Deep packet inspection (DPI) with signature-based and behavioral analysis. `suricata -c /etc/suricata/suricata.yaml -i eth0 -l /var/log/suricata` - Host-Based Collection - Sysmon Event ID 22 – DNS Query Logging, Captures DNS requests made by processes, useful for detecting C2 domains. - Sysmon Event ID 3 – Network Connection Initiated, Logs process-to-network connection relationships. - AuditD (Linux) – syscall=connect, Monitors outbound network requests from processes. `auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S connect -k network_activity` - Cloud & SaaS Traffic Collection - AWS VPC Flow Logs / Azure NSG Flow Logs / Google VPC Flow Logs, Captures metadata about inbound/outbound network traffic. - Cloud IDS (AWS GuardDuty, Azure Sentinel, Google Chronicle), Detects malicious activity in cloud environments by analyzing network traffic patterns.

Source and licensing

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