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MITRE ATT&CK® ICS Asset

A0015: Switch

A switch is a network device that connects endpoints (e.g., workstations, servers, HMIs, PLCs, etc.) so that they can communicate and share data and resources. Switches may operate at either Layer 2 or Layer 3 of the OSI Model and intelligently forward packets across the network based on the specified address (Media Access Control (MAC) address for Layer 2 and Internet Protocol (IP) address for Layer 3). Switches are typically used to define network segments and connect the devices within a particular level of the Purdue Model.

ICSA0015ICS AssetObject v1.1 Modified
Discuss defensive coverage Back to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence Medium

In an ICS environment, a switch is not just “network plumbing.” It connects HMIs, PLCs, workstations, servers, and other endpoints inside Purdue Model levels, so compromise, misconfiguration, or disruption can affect visibility, control traffic, segmentation, and operational continuity. Because ATT&CK relationships show many adversary behaviors targeting switches, leaders should treat switch management, monitoring, and recovery as part of OT resilience—not only network administration.

Executive priority

Prioritize switches as critical shared infrastructure for ICS availability and segmentation. Executive questions should include: Which switches define or connect key Purdue Model segments? Who can administer them locally or remotely? Are default or shared credentials eliminated? Can the team prove configuration integrity and recover quickly after destructive change, restart, shutdown, or denial-of-service conditions? This matters for incident decision-making, audit evidence, vulnerability prioritization, and cyber-physical risk where network disruption could affect process visibility or control.

Technical view

SOC, detection engineering, and IR teams should validate monitoring around both the data plane and management plane of embedded/network switches. The relationship context indicates relevant behaviors include CLI and GUI access, valid accounts, external remote services, remote service exploitation, discovery through port scans/broadcast/multicast, network sniffing, adversary-in-the-middle activity, standard application layer protocol use, scripting/API/native API activity, indicator removal, rootkit/hooking-style concealment, data destruction, restart/shutdown, denial of service, and supply chain compromise. Since ATT&CK provides no official detection text for this asset, coverage should be proven locally through logs, network evidence, configuration baselines, and incident response exercises.

Likely telemetry

  • Switch management access logs for CLI, GUI, and remote administration where available
  • Authentication and account-use records for administrative and service accounts
  • Configuration change history, startup/running configuration backups, and integrity comparisons
  • Network flow records and packet captures around switch-connected segments
  • Evidence of port scanning, broadcast discovery, and multicast discovery on ICS subnets

Detection direction

  • Start by mapping which switches connect critical ICS assets and Purdue Model levels, then validate that monitoring covers those segments and management interfaces.
  • Tune for unusual administrative access patterns: unexpected CLI/GUI sessions, remote service use, new source locations, abnormal timing, or account use inconsistent with maintenance windows.
  • Baseline normal ICS discovery and management traffic before alerting on scans, broadcast discovery, multicast discovery, or standard application layer protocols to reduce false positives from legitimate engineering tools.
  • Correlate network symptoms with device evidence: DoS, restart/shutdown, AiTM, and sniffing-related activity may appear first as traffic anomalies, loss of connectivity, or unexpected forwarding behavior.
  • Validate configuration integrity detection, because destructive changes or indicator removal may reduce the usefulness of on-device logs after compromise.

Mitigation priorities

  • Maintain an authoritative inventory of ICS switches, their Purdue Model role, connected critical assets, management interfaces, firmware/software state, and approved administrators.
  • Restrict switch administration paths, especially external remote services, and separate routine user traffic from management access where the environment supports it.
  • Strengthen identity controls for switch administration: remove default credentials, limit privileged accounts, and review valid-account use tied to maintenance activity.
  • Keep recoverable configuration backups and tested restoration procedures for destructive change, restart/shutdown events, and availability incidents.
  • Prioritize vulnerability management for exposed remote services and embedded/network switch software based on operational criticality and reachable attack surface.
Analyst notes and limits

This take is based on the ATT&CK ICS asset A0015 Switch and its supplied relationships. The object describes switches as Layer 2 or Layer 3 network devices connecting endpoints such as workstations, servers, HMIs, and PLCs, commonly used to define network segments and connect devices within Purdue Model levels. Relationship-driven context shows a broad set of techniques targeting this asset, so defensive value comes from validating management-plane security, network visibility, configuration integrity, and recovery readiness.

MITRE provides no official detection guidance for this asset, and tactics are not specified in the supplied object. The related technique descriptions support risk themes but do not prove any specific environment is exposed or that any control is effective. Local architecture, switch capabilities, logging configuration, remote access design, and operational constraints are required to determine actual coverage and priority.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Switch

A switch is a network device that connects endpoints (e.g., workstations, servers, HMIs, PLCs, etc.) so that they can communicate and share data and resources. Switches may operate at either Layer 2 or Layer 3 of the OSI Model and intelligently forward packets across the network based on the specified address (Media Access Control (MAC) address for Layer 2 and Internet Protocol (IP) address for Layer 3). Switches are typically used to define network segments and connect the devices within a particular level of the Purdue Model.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

39 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
ICS T0859 Valid Accounts Valid Accounts targets this object.
ICS T1695.003 Wi-Fi Sub-technique Wi-Fi targets this object.
ICS T0823 Graphical User Interface Graphical User Interface targets this object.
ICS T0834 Native API Native API targets this object.
ICS T0874 Hooking Hooking targets this object.
ICS T0840 Network Connection Enumeration Network Connection Enumeration targets this object.
ICS T0866 Exploitation of Remote Services Exploitation of Remote Services targets this object.
ICS T0886 Remote Services Remote Services targets this object.
ICS T0881 Service Stop Service Stop targets this object.
ICS T0830 Adversary-in-the-Middle Adversary-in-the-Middle targets this object.
ICS T0816 Device Restart/Shutdown Device Restart/Shutdown targets this object.
ICS T0846 Remote System Discovery Remote System Discovery targets this object.
ICS T0884 Connection Proxy Connection Proxy targets this object.
ICS T0890 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Exploitation for Privilege Escalation targets this object.
ICS T0893 Data from Local System Data from Local System targets this object.
ICS T1694.001 Default Credentials Sub-technique Default Credentials targets this object.
ICS T0871 Execution through API Execution through API targets this object.
ICS T1695 Block Communications Block Communications targets this object.
ICS T0846.003 Multicast Discovery Sub-technique Multicast Discovery targets this object.
ICS T0888 Remote System Information Discovery Remote System Information Discovery targets this object.
ICS T0846.002 Broadcast Discovery Sub-technique Broadcast Discovery targets this object.
ICS T0822 External Remote Services External Remote Services targets this object.
ICS T0869 Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Application Layer Protocol targets this object.
ICS T0883 Internet Accessible Device Internet Accessible Device targets this object.
ICS T1695.002 Ethernet Sub-technique Ethernet targets this object.
ICS T0809 Data Destruction Data Destruction targets this object.
ICS T0820 Exploitation for Evasion Exploitation for Evasion targets this object.
ICS T0892 Change Credential Change Credential targets this object.
ICS T0807 Command-Line Interface Command-Line Interface targets this object.
ICS T0872 Indicator Removal on Host Indicator Removal on Host targets this object.
ICS T0814 Denial of Service Denial of Service targets this object.
ICS T0862 Supply Chain Compromise Supply Chain Compromise targets this object.
ICS T1693.001 System Firmware Sub-technique System Firmware targets this object.
ICS T0842 Network Sniffing Network Sniffing targets this object.
ICS T0853 Scripting Scripting targets this object.
ICS T0846.001 Port Scan Sub-technique Port Scan targets this object.
ICS T1694 Insecure Credentials Insecure Credentials targets this object.
ICS T0885 Commonly Used Port Commonly Used Port targets this object.
ICS T0851 Rootkit Rootkit targets this object.
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

targets · Technique T0859: Valid Accounts ICS targets · Technique T1695.003: Wi-Fi ICS targets · Technique T0823: Graphical User Interface ICS targets · Technique T0834: Native API ICS targets · Technique T0874: Hooking ICS targets · Technique T0840: Network Connection Enumeration ICS targets · Technique T0866: Exploitation of Remote Services ICS targets · Technique T0886: Remote Services ICS targets · Technique T0881: Service Stop ICS targets · Technique T0830: Adversary-in-the-Middle ICS targets · Technique T0816: Device Restart/Shutdown ICS targets · Technique T0846: Remote System Discovery ICS targets · Technique T0884: Connection Proxy ICS targets · Technique T0890: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation ICS targets · Technique T0893: Data from Local System ICS targets · Technique T1694.001: Default Credentials ICS targets · Technique T0871: Execution through API ICS targets · Technique T1695: Block Communications ICS targets · Technique T0846.003: Multicast Discovery ICS targets · Technique T0888: Remote System Information Discovery ICS targets · Technique T0846.002: Broadcast Discovery ICS targets · Technique T0822: External Remote Services ICS targets · Technique T0869: Standard Application Layer Protocol ICS targets · Technique T0883: Internet Accessible Device ICS
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
23e390bd07c53f9b...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.1 Current bundle 23e390bd07c5…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    mitre-attack A0015
    Open source URL
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