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MITRE ATT&CK® ICS Asset

A0007: Control Server

Control servers are typically a software platform that runs on a modern server operating system (e.g., MS Windows Server). The server typically uses one or more automation protocols (e.g., Modbus, DNP3) to communicate with the various low-level control devices such as Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). The control server also usually provides an interface/network service to connect with an HMI.

ICSA0007ICS AssetObject v2.1 Modified
Discuss defensive coverage Back to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

A control server is a central ICS system that runs control software on server operating systems and communicates with PLCs, RTUs, and HMIs using automation protocols such as Modbus or DNP3. Its business significance is that it sits close to physical operations: compromise, misuse, outage, or loss of visibility here can affect process monitoring, operator control, and incident decision-making.

Executive priority

Treat control servers as high-value operational resilience assets. Leaders should ask whether these systems are inventoried, segmented, monitored, backed up, and included in incident response and recovery plans. Because ATT&CK relationships show many techniques targeting this asset class, including discovery, collection, valid accounts, rogue master behavior, denial of service, restart/shutdown, and data destruction, priority should focus on protecting availability, trusted operator access, and evidence needed to prove control effectiveness for audit and response.

Technical view

SOC, OT security, and IR teams should validate monitoring around control server host activity, control protocol communications, HMI connectivity, and interactions with PLCs/RTUs. Relationship context indicates defenders should look for abnormal process-state monitoring, automated enumeration or collection, command-line or GUI access, scripting, network sniffing, port/broadcast/multicast discovery, suspicious use of valid accounts, rogue master-like communications, unexpected restart/shutdown activity, and destructive file or data activity. Platforms are Embedded, Linux, and Windows, so coverage should be checked per deployed OS and control software role.

Likely telemetry

  • Asset inventory identifying control servers, operating systems, control applications, HMI services, and connected PLC/RTU relationships
  • Network traffic for automation protocols such as Modbus and DNP3, plus other native control-system protocols in use
  • HMI-to-control-server and control-server-to-field-device communication records
  • Windows, Linux, or embedded host logs where available, including process execution, service changes, authentication, and command-line activity
  • Remote GUI or CLI access records, including administrative sessions

Detection direction

  • Start with asset role baselining: expected HMIs, PLCs/RTUs, protocols, ports, users, services, and maintenance windows must be known before anomaly detection is meaningful.
  • Tune for deviations in control-server communications, including new peers, unusual protocol volume, unexpected broadcast or multicast discovery, and traffic patterns consistent with enumeration or sniffing preparation.
  • Correlate valid account use with OT context: logons outside normal operator/engineering workflows, unusual GUI/CLI access, and account use followed by scripting, file changes, or network discovery should receive higher priority.
  • Watch for rogue master indicators by validating that only authorized control server functions communicate with outstations or low-level control devices.
  • Include host and network evidence because official ATT&CK detection guidance is not provided for this asset; relying only on endpoint logs may miss protocol misuse, while relying only on network monitoring may miss local CLI, GUI, scripting, or data destruction activity.

Mitigation priorities

  • Prioritize accurate inventory, ownership, and criticality classification for each control server and its dependent HMIs, PLCs, RTUs, repositories, and protocols.
  • Restrict and review interactive access, service accounts, and default or shared credentials associated with control server operations.
  • Segment control server communications so only required HMIs, engineering systems, and field devices can communicate over approved protocols and paths.
  • Harden Windows, Linux, or embedded configurations according to the actual platform, minimizing unnecessary services, remote access paths, scripting exposure, and removable media use.
  • Maintain tested backups and recovery procedures for control server software, configuration, project files, and related repositories to support recovery from destruction, outage, or unauthorized change.
Analyst notes and limits

This take is based on MITRE ATT&CK asset A0007 and the supplied relationships showing techniques that target control servers. The strongest decision value is not a single detection rule but ensuring the organization can identify authorized control-server behavior and rapidly investigate deviations affecting physical process visibility or control.

MITRE does not provide official detection text or tactics for this asset in the supplied fields. The relationship descriptions are technique-level context and do not prove any specific environment is exposed or compromised. Local architecture, vendor software, protocol use, logging availability, and operational procedures are required to turn this into validated detections or control requirements.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Control Server

Control servers are typically a software platform that runs on a modern server operating system (e.g., MS Windows Server). The server typically uses one or more automation protocols (e.g., Modbus, DNP3) to communicate with the various low-level control devices such as Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). The control server also usually provides an interface/network service to connect with an HMI.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

54 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
ICS T1695.001 Serial COM Sub-technique Serial COM targets this object.
ICS T1695.002 Ethernet Sub-technique Ethernet targets this object.
ICS T0842 Network Sniffing Network Sniffing targets this object.
ICS T0872 Indicator Removal on Host Indicator Removal on Host targets this object.
ICS T0849 Masquerading Masquerading targets this object.
ICS T0890 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Exploitation for Privilege Escalation targets this object.
ICS T0809 Data Destruction Data Destruction targets this object.
ICS T0846 Remote System Discovery Remote System Discovery targets this object.
ICS T0892 Change Credential Change Credential targets this object.
ICS T0807 Command-Line Interface Command-Line Interface targets this object.
ICS T1692.002 Reporting Message Sub-technique Reporting Message targets this object.
ICS T0878 Alarm Suppression Alarm Suppression targets this object.
ICS T0834 Native API Native API targets this object.
ICS T0867 Lateral Tool Transfer Lateral Tool Transfer targets this object.
ICS T0874 Hooking Hooking targets this object.
ICS T1691.001 Command Message Sub-technique Command Message targets this object.
ICS T0886 Remote Services Remote Services targets this object.
ICS T0862 Supply Chain Compromise Supply Chain Compromise targets this object.
ICS T1691 Block Operational Technology Message Block Operational Technology Message targets this object.
ICS T0894 System Binary Proxy Execution System Binary Proxy Execution targets this object.
ICS T0893 Data from Local System Data from Local System targets this object.
ICS T0869 Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Application Layer Protocol targets this object.
ICS T1695 Block Communications Block Communications targets this object.
ICS T0802 Automated Collection Automated Collection targets this object.
ICS T0846.001 Port Scan Sub-technique Port Scan targets this object.
ICS T0846.003 Multicast Discovery Sub-technique Multicast Discovery targets this object.
ICS T1692 Unauthorized Message Unauthorized Message targets this object.
ICS T0801 Monitor Process State Monitor Process State targets this object.
ICS T0881 Service Stop Service Stop targets this object.
ICS T0851 Rootkit Rootkit targets this object.
ICS T0823 Graphical User Interface Graphical User Interface targets this object.
ICS T0811 Data from Information Repositories Data from Information Repositories targets this object.
ICS T1694 Insecure Credentials Insecure Credentials targets this object.
ICS T1692.001 Command Message Sub-technique Command Message targets this object.
ICS T1694.001 Default Credentials Sub-technique Default Credentials targets this object.
ICS T0820 Exploitation for Evasion Exploitation for Evasion targets this object.
ICS T0848 Rogue Master Rogue Master targets this object.
ICS T0866 Exploitation of Remote Services Exploitation of Remote Services targets this object.
ICS T0884 Connection Proxy Connection Proxy targets this object.
ICS T0853 Scripting Scripting targets this object.
ICS T0859 Valid Accounts Valid Accounts targets this object.
ICS T0840 Network Connection Enumeration Network Connection Enumeration targets this object.
ICS T0806 Brute Force I/O Brute Force I/O targets this object.
ICS T0888 Remote System Information Discovery Remote System Information Discovery targets this object.
ICS T1691.002 Reporting Message Sub-technique Reporting Message targets this object.
ICS T1695.003 Wi-Fi Sub-technique Wi-Fi targets this object.
ICS T0861 Point & Tag Identification Point & Tag Identification targets this object.
ICS T0830 Adversary-in-the-Middle Adversary-in-the-Middle targets this object.
ICS T0847 Replication Through Removable Media Replication Through Removable Media targets this object.
ICS T0816 Device Restart/Shutdown Device Restart/Shutdown targets this object.
ICS T0814 Denial of Service Denial of Service targets this object.
ICS T0846.002 Broadcast Discovery Sub-technique Broadcast Discovery targets this object.
ICS T0895 Autorun Image Autorun Image targets this object.
ICS T0885 Commonly Used Port Commonly Used Port targets this object.
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

targets · Technique T1695.001: Serial COM ICS targets · Technique T1695.002: Ethernet ICS targets · Technique T0842: Network Sniffing ICS targets · Technique T0872: Indicator Removal on Host ICS targets · Technique T0849: Masquerading ICS targets · Technique T0890: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation ICS targets · Technique T0809: Data Destruction ICS targets · Technique T0846: Remote System Discovery ICS targets · Technique T0892: Change Credential ICS targets · Technique T0807: Command-Line Interface ICS targets · Technique T1692.002: Reporting Message ICS targets · Technique T0878: Alarm Suppression ICS targets · Technique T0834: Native API ICS targets · Technique T0867: Lateral Tool Transfer ICS targets · Technique T0874: Hooking ICS targets · Technique T1691.001: Command Message ICS targets · Technique T0886: Remote Services ICS targets · Technique T0862: Supply Chain Compromise ICS targets · Technique T1691: Block Operational Technology Message ICS targets · Technique T0894: System Binary Proxy Execution ICS targets · Technique T0893: Data from Local System ICS targets · Technique T0869: Standard Application Layer Protocol ICS targets · Technique T1695: Block Communications ICS targets · Technique T0802: Automated Collection ICS
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
2.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
f6bef8db32aecfe0...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 2.1 Current bundle f6bef8db32ae…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Guidance - NIST SP800-82

    Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attack A0007
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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