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MITRE ATT&CK® ICS Asset

A0003: Programmable Logic Controller (PLC)

A Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) is an embedded programmable control device. PLCs typically utilize a modular architecture with separate modules used to support its processing capabilities, communication mediums, and I/O interfaces. PLCs allow for the deployment of customized programs/logic to control or monitor an operational process. This logic is defined using industry specific programming languages, such as IEC 61131 [1], which define the set of tasks and program organizational units (POUs) included in the device’s programs. PLCs also typically have distinct operating modes (e.g., Remote, Run, Program, Stop) which are used to determine when the device can be programmed or whether it should execute the custom logic.

ICSA0003ICS AssetObject v1.1 Modified
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Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

A PLC is the embedded controller that runs customized logic for an operational process. In practical risk terms, it is often where cyber access can become a physical or production-impacting event. The related ATT&CK techniques show why PLC coverage matters: adversaries may monitor process state, upload or download programs, modify tasking, parameters, alarms, or I/O behavior, force restart/shutdown, or disrupt device functionality.

Executive priority

Treat PLCs as critical operational assets, not just network endpoints. Leadership should ask whether the organization has a current inventory of PLCs, approved logic/configuration baselines, controlled engineering access, recoverable backups, and evidence that unauthorized program, mode, parameter, alarm, and I/O changes would be noticed. This is material for business continuity, OT incident response readiness, vulnerability prioritization, and compliance evidence around change control and safety-relevant operations.

Technical view

SOC, OT engineering, and IR teams should validate visibility around the PLC lifecycle: engineering workstation access, vendor programming activity, program upload/download events, online edits, program append activity, controller mode changes, firmware update mode activation, restart/shutdown events, parameter and alarm changes, and unusual I/O point changes. Because ATT&CK provides no official detection for this asset, coverage should be proven locally against the specific PLC models, programming tools, control protocols, historian/OPC sources, and network paths in use.

Likely telemetry

  • PLC asset inventory, firmware/software version, operating mode, and role in the process
  • Engineering workstation and jump host authentication, process execution, and vendor programming software usage logs
  • PLC program upload, download, online edit, program append, tasking, and configuration change records where available
  • Network traffic to and from PLCs, including native control protocol activity and OPC-related collection where present
  • Historian, OPC tag, and process state data used to detect unexpected reads or value changes

Detection direction

  • Build detections around deviations from approved maintenance windows, known engineering hosts, and authorized users rather than treating all PLC programming activity as malicious.
  • Compare running PLC logic, task associations, parameters, alarm settings, and configuration against approved baselines after maintenance and during investigations.
  • Alert on program download/upload, online edit, program append, mode changes, firmware update mode, restart/shutdown, and repeated I/O value changes when they occur outside expected procedures.
  • Correlate network discovery, port scan, broadcast discovery, sniffing indicators, and process-state monitoring with later PLC programming or configuration activity.
  • Account for false positives from legitimate engineering work, commissioning, testing, and emergency maintenance; require operational context before escalation decisions.

Mitigation priorities

  • Maintain an authoritative PLC inventory mapped to process criticality and recovery priority.
  • Restrict and monitor access to engineering workstations, jump hosts, vendor programming software, and interfaces capable of PLC program or configuration changes.
  • Enforce formal change control for PLC logic, tasking, parameters, alarm settings, firmware update mode, operating mode, and I/O overrides.
  • Keep offline, tested backups of PLC programs and configurations to support rapid validation and recovery.
  • Segment and monitor PLC network paths so discovery, collection, and programming activity are limited to expected systems and procedures.
Analyst notes and limits

This take is based on the ATT&CK ICS asset A0003 and its relationships to PLC-targeting techniques including program upload/download, online edit, program append, modify controller tasking, manipulate I/O image, modify parameter, modify alarm settings, process-state monitoring, discovery, DoS, restart/shutdown, firmware update mode, and exploitation for evasion. The IEC 61131-3 reference supports the importance of tasks, programs, and programming languages in PLC logic governance.

MITRE does not provide an official detection section for this asset, and the supplied object does not specify particular vendors, protocols beyond examples in related descriptions, tactics, or active threat activity. Local PLC models, engineering workflows, logging capabilities, network architecture, and safety/process context are required to determine actual detection and control coverage.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Programmable Logic Controller (PLC)

A Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) is an embedded programmable control device. PLCs typically utilize a modular architecture with separate modules used to support its processing capabilities, communication mediums, and I/O interfaces. PLCs allow for the deployment of customized programs/logic to control or monitor an operational process. This logic is defined using industry specific programming languages, such as IEC 61131 [1], which define the set of tasks and program organizational units (POUs) included in the device’s programs. PLCs also typically have distinct operating modes (e.g., Remote, Run, Program, Stop) which are used to determine when the device can be programmed or whether it should execute the custom logic.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

61 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
ICS T0846.003 Multicast Discovery Sub-technique Multicast Discovery targets this object.
ICS T0890 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Exploitation for Privilege Escalation targets this object.
ICS T0846 Remote System Discovery Remote System Discovery targets this object.
ICS T1695 Block Communications Block Communications targets this object.
ICS T1693.002 Module Firmware Sub-technique Module Firmware targets this object.
ICS T1691 Block Operational Technology Message Block Operational Technology Message targets this object.
ICS T1694 Insecure Credentials Insecure Credentials targets this object.
ICS T0874 Hooking Hooking targets this object.
ICS T0868 Detect Operating Mode Detect Operating Mode targets this object.
ICS T0869 Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Application Layer Protocol targets this object.
ICS T1695.003 Wi-Fi Sub-technique Wi-Fi targets this object.
ICS T1692 Unauthorized Message Unauthorized Message targets this object.
ICS T0871 Execution through API Execution through API targets this object.
ICS T0843.002 Online Edit Sub-technique Online Edit targets this object.
ICS T1693 Modify Firmware Modify Firmware targets this object.
ICS T0843 Program Download Program Download targets this object.
ICS T1691.001 Command Message Sub-technique Command Message targets this object.
ICS T0845 Program Upload Program Upload targets this object.
ICS T0848 Rogue Master Rogue Master targets this object.
ICS T0885 Commonly Used Port Commonly Used Port targets this object.
ICS T0888 Remote System Information Discovery Remote System Information Discovery targets this object.
ICS T0846.002 Broadcast Discovery Sub-technique Broadcast Discovery targets this object.
ICS T1693.001 System Firmware Sub-technique System Firmware targets this object.
ICS T1691.002 Reporting Message Sub-technique Reporting Message targets this object.
ICS T0802 Automated Collection Automated Collection targets this object.
ICS T0859 Valid Accounts Valid Accounts targets this object.
ICS T0838 Modify Alarm Settings Modify Alarm Settings targets this object.
ICS T0851 Rootkit Rootkit targets this object.
ICS T0892 Change Credential Change Credential targets this object.
ICS T0842 Network Sniffing Network Sniffing targets this object.
ICS T0872 Indicator Removal on Host Indicator Removal on Host targets this object.
ICS T0843.003 Program Append Sub-technique Program Append targets this object.
ICS T0801 Monitor Process State Monitor Process State targets this object.
ICS T0847 Replication Through Removable Media Replication Through Removable Media targets this object.
ICS T0843.001 Download All Sub-technique Download All targets this object.
ICS T1695.002 Ethernet Sub-technique Ethernet targets this object.
ICS T0806 Brute Force I/O Brute Force I/O targets this object.
ICS T0840 Network Connection Enumeration Network Connection Enumeration targets this object.
ICS T0878 Alarm Suppression Alarm Suppression targets this object.
ICS T0862 Supply Chain Compromise Supply Chain Compromise targets this object.
ICS T0866 Exploitation of Remote Services Exploitation of Remote Services targets this object.
ICS T0814 Denial of Service Denial of Service targets this object.
ICS T1694.001 Default Credentials Sub-technique Default Credentials targets this object.
ICS T0820 Exploitation for Evasion Exploitation for Evasion targets this object.
ICS T0846.001 Port Scan Sub-technique Port Scan targets this object.
ICS T1692.002 Reporting Message Sub-technique Reporting Message targets this object.
ICS T0836 Modify Parameter Modify Parameter targets this object.
ICS T1695.001 Serial COM Sub-technique Serial COM targets this object.
ICS T0816 Device Restart/Shutdown Device Restart/Shutdown targets this object.
ICS T0884 Connection Proxy Connection Proxy targets this object.
ICS T0835 Manipulate I/O Image Manipulate I/O Image targets this object.
ICS T0809 Data Destruction Data Destruction targets this object.
ICS T0834 Native API Native API targets this object.
ICS T0830 Adversary-in-the-Middle Adversary-in-the-Middle targets this object.
ICS T0858 Change Operating Mode Change Operating Mode targets this object.
ICS T0877 I/O Image I/O Image targets this object.
ICS T0821 Modify Controller Tasking Modify Controller Tasking targets this object.
ICS T0800 Activate Firmware Update Mode Activate Firmware Update Mode targets this object.
ICS T1692.001 Command Message Sub-technique Command Message targets this object.
ICS T0861 Point & Tag Identification Point & Tag Identification targets this object.
ICS T0889 Modify Program Modify Program targets this object.
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

targets · Technique T0846.003: Multicast Discovery ICS targets · Technique T0890: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation ICS targets · Technique T0846: Remote System Discovery ICS targets · Technique T1695: Block Communications ICS targets · Technique T1693.002: Module Firmware ICS targets · Technique T1691: Block Operational Technology Message ICS targets · Technique T1694: Insecure Credentials ICS targets · Technique T0874: Hooking ICS targets · Technique T0868: Detect Operating Mode ICS targets · Technique T0869: Standard Application Layer Protocol ICS targets · Technique T1695.003: Wi-Fi ICS targets · Technique T1692: Unauthorized Message ICS targets · Technique T0871: Execution through API ICS targets · Technique T0843.002: Online Edit ICS targets · Technique T1693: Modify Firmware ICS targets · Technique T0843: Program Download ICS targets · Technique T1691.001: Command Message ICS targets · Technique T0845: Program Upload ICS targets · Technique T0848: Rogue Master ICS targets · Technique T0885: Commonly Used Port ICS targets · Technique T0888: Remote System Information Discovery ICS targets · Technique T0846.002: Broadcast Discovery ICS targets · Technique T1693.001: System Firmware ICS targets · Technique T1691.002: Reporting Message ICS
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
4f64d12e9fb06229...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.1 Current bundle 4f64d12e9fb0…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    IEC February 2013

    IEC 2013, February 20 IEC 61131-3:2013 Programmable controllers - Part 3: Programming languages Retrieved. 2019/10/22

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attack A0003
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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