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MITRE ATT&CK® ICS Asset

A0002: Human-Machine Interface (HMI)

Human-Machine Interfaces (HMIs) are systems used by an operator to monitor the real-time status of an operational process and to perform necessary control functions, including the adjustment of device parameters. An HMI can take various forms, including a dedicated screen or control panel integrated with a specific device/controller, or a customizable software GUI application running on a standard operating system (e.g., MS Windows) that interfaces with a control/SCADA server. The HMI is critical to ensuring operators have sufficient visibility and control over the operational process.

ICSA0002ICS AssetObject v1.1 Modified
Discuss defensive coverage Back to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

An HMI is the operator’s window into an industrial process and, in many environments, a control point for changing parameters. That makes it a business-critical asset: loss of visibility, misleading displays, unauthorized control actions, or alarm manipulation can directly affect operational resilience and safety decisions. For leaders, the key issue is not just whether the HMI exists, but whether the organization can prove who can access it, what changes are logged, how it is monitored, and how operations continue if it becomes unavailable or untrusted.

Executive priority

Treat HMIs as priority ICS assets for resilience, audit evidence, and incident decision-making. The supplied ATT&CK relationships show HMIs can be targeted by behaviors involving process-state monitoring, GUI/CLI access, discovery, network sniffing, removable media, masquerading, rootkits, screen capture, alarm-setting modification, denial of service, restart/shutdown, and data destruction. Executives should ask whether HMI access paths, alarm integrity, backup/restore procedures, removable-media handling, and network visibility are explicitly tested in OT security reviews and incident response exercises.

Technical view

This object is an ICS asset, not a technique, and MITRE does not provide detection guidance for it. SOC, OT security, and IR teams should validate HMI coverage around the supplied platforms, Linux and Windows, and the relationship set. Practical validation should include authentication and session evidence for local and remote GUI/CLI access, OS and application logs, HMI configuration and alarm-change records, process/OPC/historian-related visibility where available, network communications to control/SCADA servers and field devices, discovery/scan indicators, removable-media activity, file/process anomalies consistent with masquerading or scripting, and availability events such as unexpected shutdown, restart, or denial-of-service conditions.

Likely telemetry

  • HMI operating system security, system, application, process, service, and command-line logs on Windows or Linux
  • HMI application logs, operator action logs, configuration-change records, and alarm-setting change records
  • Authentication, authorization, and session records for local access, remote GUI access, and CLI access
  • Network flow, packet, and protocol telemetry between HMIs, control/SCADA servers, historians, OPC sources, and other ICS devices
  • Discovery-related telemetry such as port scans, broadcast discovery, multicast discovery, and remote system enumeration

Detection direction

  • Because MITRE provides no official detection text for this asset, start by building a local HMI behavior baseline: expected users, expected remote-access paths, expected peer systems, expected protocols, expected vendor applications, and normal alarm/configuration workflows.
  • Tune monitoring for relationship-driven scenarios: process-state collection, GUI or CLI access, network sniffing, discovery, rogue master-like communications, alarm setting changes, screen capture, removable-media execution, unexpected restart/shutdown, denial-of-service symptoms, and destructive file activity.
  • Correlate host and network evidence. HMI compromise or misuse may appear as legitimate-looking operator actions unless paired with identity, session, change-management, and network context.
  • Review false positives carefully in OT environments. Engineering maintenance, vendor support, firmware work, and operator troubleshooting can resemble discovery, scripting, GUI access, CLI use, or configuration changes.
  • Identify blind spots that commonly decide coverage: unmanaged HMI hosts, limited endpoint agents in OT, missing HMI application audit logs, remote-access tools outside SOC visibility, lack of packet/flow monitoring on control networks, and incomplete removable-media logging.

Mitigation priorities

  • Prioritize asset ownership and criticality: maintain an inventory of HMI systems, operating systems, connected control/SCADA dependencies, users, and remote-access methods.
  • Restrict and review HMI access paths, including local accounts, remote GUI access, CLI access, vendor support access, and removable-media use.
  • Protect HMI integrity with change control for application configuration, alarm settings, operator displays, and authorized software.
  • Segment and monitor HMI communications so expected control/SCADA relationships are known and deviations can be investigated.
  • Prepare operational resilience procedures for HMI outage or loss of trust, including backup/restore, alternate operator visibility, and incident escalation paths.
Analyst notes and limits

The relationship context is broad and makes the HMI a high-value defensive focal point rather than a single behavior. The most useful Glexia assessment work would map each local HMI to its normal users, software, network peers, alarm/configuration workflow, and recovery dependencies, then test whether SOC and OT teams can distinguish authorized engineering activity from suspicious activity.

This take is based only on the supplied ATT&CK asset record, external references, and relationships. The object has no ATT&CK tactics and no official detection guidance. The supplied relationships indicate techniques that target HMIs, but they do not prove activity in any specific environment, vendor product, or customer network. Local architecture, HMI software, logging configuration, safety requirements, and operational procedures are required to determine actual risk and coverage.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Human-Machine Interface (HMI)

Human-Machine Interfaces (HMIs) are systems used by an operator to monitor the real-time status of an operational process and to perform necessary control functions, including the adjustment of device parameters. An HMI can take various forms, including a dedicated screen or control panel integrated with a specific device/controller, or a customizable software GUI application running on a standard operating system (e.g., MS Windows) that interfaces with a control/SCADA server. The HMI is critical to ensuring operators have sufficient visibility and control over the operational process.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

57 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
ICS T0816 Device Restart/Shutdown Device Restart/Shutdown targets this object.
ICS T0807 Command-Line Interface Command-Line Interface targets this object.
ICS T0800 Activate Firmware Update Mode Activate Firmware Update Mode targets this object.
ICS T0878 Alarm Suppression Alarm Suppression targets this object.
ICS T1691.002 Reporting Message Sub-technique Reporting Message targets this object.
ICS T0838 Modify Alarm Settings Modify Alarm Settings targets this object.
ICS T0823 Graphical User Interface Graphical User Interface targets this object.
ICS T0866 Exploitation of Remote Services Exploitation of Remote Services targets this object.
ICS T0874 Hooking Hooking targets this object.
ICS T0847 Replication Through Removable Media Replication Through Removable Media targets this object.
ICS T1694 Insecure Credentials Insecure Credentials targets this object.
ICS T1692.002 Reporting Message Sub-technique Reporting Message targets this object.
ICS T0848 Rogue Master Rogue Master targets this object.
ICS T0881 Service Stop Service Stop targets this object.
ICS T0801 Monitor Process State Monitor Process State targets this object.
ICS T0840 Network Connection Enumeration Network Connection Enumeration targets this object.
ICS T0888 Remote System Information Discovery Remote System Information Discovery targets this object.
ICS T0846.001 Port Scan Sub-technique Port Scan targets this object.
ICS T0863 User Execution User Execution targets this object.
ICS T0884 Connection Proxy Connection Proxy targets this object.
ICS T0834 Native API Native API targets this object.
ICS T0830 Adversary-in-the-Middle Adversary-in-the-Middle targets this object.
ICS T0846.002 Broadcast Discovery Sub-technique Broadcast Discovery targets this object.
ICS T0849 Masquerading Masquerading targets this object.
ICS T0890 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Exploitation for Privilege Escalation targets this object.
ICS T0871 Execution through API Execution through API targets this object.
ICS T0872 Indicator Removal on Host Indicator Removal on Host targets this object.
ICS T0814 Denial of Service Denial of Service targets this object.
ICS T0893 Data from Local System Data from Local System targets this object.
ICS T0842 Network Sniffing Network Sniffing targets this object.
ICS T0859 Valid Accounts Valid Accounts targets this object.
ICS T0869 Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Application Layer Protocol targets this object.
ICS T0886 Remote Services Remote Services targets this object.
ICS T1692.001 Command Message Sub-technique Command Message targets this object.
ICS T1693.001 System Firmware Sub-technique System Firmware targets this object.
ICS T1692 Unauthorized Message Unauthorized Message targets this object.
ICS T0851 Rootkit Rootkit targets this object.
ICS T1694.001 Default Credentials Sub-technique Default Credentials targets this object.
ICS T0894 System Binary Proxy Execution System Binary Proxy Execution targets this object.
ICS T1695.001 Serial COM Sub-technique Serial COM targets this object.
ICS T0852 Screen Capture Screen Capture targets this object.
ICS T0806 Brute Force I/O Brute Force I/O targets this object.
ICS T0820 Exploitation for Evasion Exploitation for Evasion targets this object.
ICS T1695.002 Ethernet Sub-technique Ethernet targets this object.
ICS T0892 Change Credential Change Credential targets this object.
ICS T1691.001 Command Message Sub-technique Command Message targets this object.
ICS T0846.003 Multicast Discovery Sub-technique Multicast Discovery targets this object.
ICS T0846 Remote System Discovery Remote System Discovery targets this object.
ICS T0862 Supply Chain Compromise Supply Chain Compromise targets this object.
ICS T0853 Scripting Scripting targets this object.
ICS T0885 Commonly Used Port Commonly Used Port targets this object.
ICS T0861 Point & Tag Identification Point & Tag Identification targets this object.
ICS T0809 Data Destruction Data Destruction targets this object.
ICS T1695.003 Wi-Fi Sub-technique Wi-Fi targets this object.
ICS T1691 Block Operational Technology Message Block Operational Technology Message targets this object.
ICS T1695 Block Communications Block Communications targets this object.
ICS T0895 Autorun Image Autorun Image targets this object.
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

targets · Technique T0816: Device Restart/Shutdown ICS targets · Technique T0807: Command-Line Interface ICS targets · Technique T0800: Activate Firmware Update Mode ICS targets · Technique T0878: Alarm Suppression ICS targets · Technique T1691.002: Reporting Message ICS targets · Technique T0838: Modify Alarm Settings ICS targets · Technique T0823: Graphical User Interface ICS targets · Technique T0866: Exploitation of Remote Services ICS targets · Technique T0874: Hooking ICS targets · Technique T0847: Replication Through Removable Media ICS targets · Technique T1694: Insecure Credentials ICS targets · Technique T1692.002: Reporting Message ICS targets · Technique T0848: Rogue Master ICS targets · Technique T0881: Service Stop ICS targets · Technique T0801: Monitor Process State ICS targets · Technique T0840: Network Connection Enumeration ICS targets · Technique T0888: Remote System Information Discovery ICS targets · Technique T0846.001: Port Scan ICS targets · Technique T0863: User Execution ICS targets · Technique T0884: Connection Proxy ICS targets · Technique T0834: Native API ICS targets · Technique T0830: Adversary-in-the-Middle ICS targets · Technique T0846.002: Broadcast Discovery ICS targets · Technique T0849: Masquerading ICS
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
25b9614ccf5c7d66...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.1 Current bundle 25b9614ccf5c…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    IEC February 2019

    IEC 2019, February Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components Retrieved. 2020/09/25

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attack A0002
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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