{
  "type": "attack-pattern",
  "spec_version": "2.1",
  "id": "attack-pattern--40f5caa0-4cb7-4117-89fc-d421bb493df3",
  "created": "2020-09-30T17:09:31.878Z",
  "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
  "revoked": false,
  "external_references": [
    {
      "source_name": "mitre-attack",
      "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001",
      "external_id": "T1583.001"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "URI Unique",
      "description": "Australian Cyber Security Centre. National Security Agency. (2020, April 21). Detect and Prevent Web Shell Malware. Retrieved February 9, 2024.",
      "url": "https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "PaypalScam",
      "description": "Bob Sullivan. (2000, July 24). PayPal alert! Beware the 'PaypaI' scam. Retrieved March 2, 2017.",
      "url": "https://www.zdnet.com/article/paypal-alert-beware-the-paypai-scam-5000109103/"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "CISA IDN ST05-016",
      "description": "CISA. (2019, September 27). Security Tip (ST05-016): Understanding Internationalized Domain Names. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
      "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-016"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "CISA MSS Sep 2020",
      "description": "CISA. (2020, September 14). Alert (AA20-258A): Chinese Ministry of State Security-Affiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity. Retrieved October 1, 2020.",
      "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-258a"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "bypass_webproxy_filtering",
      "description": "Fehrman, B. (2017, April 13). How to Bypass Web-Proxy Filtering. Retrieved September 20, 2019.",
      "url": "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/bypass-web-proxy-filtering/"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "FireEye APT28",
      "description": "FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.",
      "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20151022204649/https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "Invictus IR DangerDev 2024",
      "description": "Invictus Incident Response. (2024, January 31). The curious case of DangerDev@protonmail.me. Retrieved March 19, 2024.",
      "url": "https://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "Domain_Steal_CC",
      "description": "Krebs, B. (2018, November 13). That Domain You Forgot to Renew? Yeah, it’s Now Stealing Credit Cards. Retrieved September 20, 2019.",
      "url": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/11/that-domain-you-forgot-to-renew-yeah-its-now-stealing-credit-cards/"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "tt_obliqueRAT",
      "description": "Malhotra, A., McKay, K. et al. (2021, May 13). Transparent Tribe APT expands its Windows malware arsenal . Retrieved July 29, 2022.",
      "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/05/transparent-tribe-infra-and-targeting.html"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "tt_httrack_fake_domains",
      "description": "Malhotra, A., Thattil, J. et al. (2022, March 29). Transparent Tribe campaign uses new bespoke malware to target Indian government officials . Retrieved September 6, 2022.",
      "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/03/transparent-tribe-new-campaign.html"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "Mandiant APT1",
      "description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.",
      "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "Categorisation_not_boundary",
      "description": "MDSec Research. (2017, July). Categorisation is not a Security Boundary. Retrieved September 20, 2019.",
      "url": "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2017/07/categorisation-is-not-a-security-boundary/"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "URI",
      "description": "Michael Cobb. (2007, October 11). Preparing for uniform resource identifier (URI) exploits. Retrieved February 9, 2024.",
      "url": "https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/tip/Preparing-for-uniform-resource-identifier-URI-exploits"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "Redirectors_Domain_Fronting",
      "description": "Mudge, R. (2017, February 6). High-reputation Redirectors and Domain Fronting. Retrieved July 11, 2022.",
      "url": "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/blog/high-reputation-redirectors-and-domain-fronting/"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "URI Use",
      "description": "Nathan McFeters. Billy Kim Rios. Rob Carter.. (2008). URI Use and Abuse. Retrieved February 9, 2024.",
      "url": "https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-08/McFeters-Rios-Carter/Presentation/bh-dc-08-mcfeters-rios-carter.pdf"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "iOS URL Scheme",
      "description": "Ostorlab. (n.d.). iOS URL Scheme Hijacking. Retrieved February 9, 2024.",
      "url": "https://docs.ostorlab.co/kb/IPA_URL_SCHEME_HIJACKING/index.html"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "lazgroup_idn_phishing",
      "description": "RISKIQ. (2017, December 20). Mining Insights: Infrastructure Analysis of Lazarus Group Cyber Attacks on the Cryptocurrency Industry. Retrieved July 29, 2022.",
      "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20171223000420/https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/lazarus-group-cryptocurrency/"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "httrack_unhcr",
      "description": "RISKIQ. (2022, March 15). RiskIQ Threat Intelligence Roundup: Campaigns Targeting Ukraine and Global Malware Infrastructure. Retrieved July 29, 2022.",
      "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20220527112908/https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/ukraine-malware-infrastructure/"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
      "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
      "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
    }
  ],
  "object_marking_refs": [
    "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
  ],
  "modified": "2026-05-12T15:12:00.629Z",
  "name": "Domains",
  "description": "Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free.\n\nAdversaries may use acquired domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Command and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Adversaries may also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) and different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic, Greek, etc.) to execute \"IDN homograph attacks,\" creating visually similar lookalike domains used to deliver malware to victim machines.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016)(Citation: tt_httrack_fake_domains)(Citation: tt_obliqueRAT)(Citation: httrack_unhcr)(Citation: lazgroup_idn_phishing)\n\nDifferent URIs/URLs may also be dynamically generated to uniquely serve malicious content to victims (including one-time, single use domain names).(Citation: iOS URL Scheme)(Citation: URI)(Citation: URI Use)(Citation: URI Unique)\n\nAdversaries may also acquire and repurpose expired domains, which may be potentially already allowlisted/trusted by defenders based on an existing reputation/history.(Citation: Categorisation_not_boundary)(Citation: Domain_Steal_CC)(Citation: Redirectors_Domain_Fronting)(Citation: bypass_webproxy_filtering)\n\nDomain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nIn addition to legitimately purchasing a domain, an adversary may register a new domain in a compromised environment. For example, in AWS environments, adversaries may leverage the Route53 domain service to register a domain and create hosted zones pointing to resources of the threat actor’s choosing.(Citation: Invictus IR DangerDev 2024)",
  "kill_chain_phases": [
    {
      "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
      "phase_name": "resource-development"
    }
  ],
  "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
  "x_mitre_contributors": [
    "Wes Hurd",
    "Vinayak Wadhwa, Lucideus",
    "Deloitte Threat Library Team",
    "Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix",
    "Menachem Goldstein",
    "Nikola Kovac"
  ],
  "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
  "x_mitre_domains": [
    "enterprise-attack"
  ],
  "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
  "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
  "x_mitre_platforms": [
    "PRE"
  ],
  "x_mitre_version": "1.4"
}