{
  "type": "attack-pattern",
  "spec_version": "2.1",
  "id": "attack-pattern--08e22979-d320-48ed-8711-e7bf94aabb13",
  "created": "2022-04-05T20:11:08.894Z",
  "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
  "revoked": false,
  "external_references": [
    {
      "source_name": "mitre-attack",
      "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1638",
      "external_id": "T1638"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "mitd_checkpoint",
      "description": "Check Point Research Team. (2018, August 12). Man-in-the-Disk: A New Attack Surface for Android Apps. Retrieved October 31, 2023.",
      "url": "https://blog.checkpoint.com/security/man-in-the-disk-a-new-attack-surface-for-android-apps/"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "mitd_kaspersky",
      "description": "Drozhzhin, A. (2018, August 27). Man-in-the-Disk: A new and dangerous way to hack Android. Retrieved October 31, 2023.",
      "url": "https://usa.kaspersky.com/blog/man-in-the-disk/16089/"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "NSC_Android",
      "description": "Lee, A., Ramirez, T. (2018, August 15). A Security Analyst’s Guide to Network Security Configuration in Android P . Retrieved February 7, 2024.",
      "url": "https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2018/08/15/a-security-analysts-guide-to-network-security-configuration-in-android-p/"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "mitd_checkpoint_research",
      "description": "Makkaveev, S. (2018, August 12). Man-in-the-Disk: Android Apps Exposed via External Storage. Retrieved October 31, 2023.",
      "url": "https://research.checkpoint.com/androids-man-in-the-disk/"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue",
      "url": "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-3.html",
      "external_id": "CEL-3"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue",
      "url": "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-0.html",
      "external_id": "APP-0"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue",
      "url": "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html",
      "external_id": "APP-1"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue",
      "url": "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-8.html",
      "external_id": "APP-8"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue",
      "url": "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-12.html",
      "external_id": "ECO-12"
    }
  ],
  "object_marking_refs": [
    "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
  ],
  "modified": "2025-10-24T17:48:21.401Z",
  "name": "Adversary-in-the-Middle",
  "description": "Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices to support follow-on behaviors such as [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002) or [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1642).  \n\n \n\n[Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1638) can be achieved through several mechanisms. For example, a malicious application may register itself as a VPN client, effectively redirecting device traffic to adversary-owned resources. Registering as a VPN client requires user consent on both Android and iOS; additionally, a special entitlement granted by Apple is needed for iOS devices. Alternatively, a malicious application with escalation privileges may utilize those privileges to gain access to network traffic.   \n\n\n Specific to Android devices, adversary-in-the-disk is a type of AiTM attack where adversaries monitor and manipulate data that is exchanged between applications and external storage.(Citation: mitd_kaspersky)(Citation: mitd_checkpoint)(Citation: mitd_checkpoint_research) To accomplish this, a malicious application firsts requests for access to multimedia files on the device (`READ_EXTERNAL STORAGE` and `WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE`), then the application reads data on the device and/or writes malware to the device. Though the request for access is common, when used maliciously, adversaries may access files and other sensitive data due to abusing the permission. Multiple applications were shown to be vulnerable against this attack; however, scrutiny of permissions and input validations may mitigate this attack.    \n\nOutside of a mobile device, adversaries may be able to capture traffic by employing a rogue base station or Wi-Fi access point. These devices will allow adversaries to capture network traffic after it has left the device, while it is flowing to its destination. On a local network, enterprise techniques could be used, such as [ARP Cache Poisoning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002) or [DHCP Spoofing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/003).  \n\n \n\nIf applications properly encrypt their network traffic, sensitive data may not be accessible to adversaries, depending on the point of capture. For example, properly implementing Apple’s Application Transport Security (ATS) and Android’s Network Security Configuration (NSC) may prevent sensitive data leaks.(Citation: NSC_Android)",
  "kill_chain_phases": [
    {
      "kill_chain_name": "mitre-mobile-attack",
      "phase_name": "collection"
    }
  ],
  "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
  "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
  "x_mitre_domains": [
    "mobile-attack"
  ],
  "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
  "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
  "x_mitre_platforms": [
    "Android",
    "iOS"
  ],
  "x_mitre_version": "2.2",
  "x_mitre_tactic_type": [
    "Post-Adversary Device Access"
  ]
}